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In 2004, the Dutch government changed the law regarding welfare benefits for disabled citizens. The main reason was the large increase in the number of recipients to approximately 10% of the Dutch workforce. A new set of rules was implemented by the Dutch organisation for employees’ insurance (UWV). According to these new stricter rules, existing recipients were reassessed, resulting in 110,000 recipients losing their benefits. Many of the insurance doctors involved encountered substantial professional and moral issues with the reassessments. About 240 doctors urged a strike against this new policy, and some decided to simply quit (NVVG 2005)​[1]​. The following quote by an insurance doctor is illustrative (cited in NRC 2005a: 3):

The UWV is nowadays called the Lourdes of the North: you visit the agency as work-disabled, you leave able to work… It is becoming extremely controversial. I cannot reconcile it with my conscience anymore. I have sworn an oath which comes down to protecting the weak.

This example is not unique: public professionals often appear to have difficulties identifying with policy programmes they have to implement. Research shows that public professionals are experiencing increasing pressure as they have to consider several output performance norms which often conflict with their own professional standards or with the demands of increasingly empowered clients. Several studies show an increasing discontent among public professionals (Hebson et al. 2003; Pratchett and Wingfield 1996). 
	In this article, we will analyse this discontent in terms of ‘policy alienation’, thereby elaborating on the concept of work alienation developed in the field of sociology of work and labour (for example Blauner 1964). We define policy alienation as a general cognitive state of psychological disconnection from the policy programme being implemented, here by a public professional who regularly interacts directly with clients. 
	Studying the policy alienation of public professionals and its causes is not only theoretically interesting (due to its links with policy implementation), it is also vital for policymakers. Policy alienation does not only influence the effectiveness of a policy programme (Sabatier 1986), it will also affect the quality of interactions between professionals and citizens, which may eventually influence the output legitimacy of government (Bekkers et al. 2007). By applying the policy alienation perspective, we can also enhance understanding on how New Public Management (NPM) is experienced by professionals implementing policies. Ackroyd et al. (2007: 9) note the dearth of systematic studies on the effects of NPM restructuring. In particular, there are few studies on the NPM experiences of (street-level) professionals. Using the policy alienation perspective, we can examine what really happens on ‘the work floor’.




2	A theoretical framework for policy alienation

In this section, we concentrate on the first research objective: conceptualising policy alienation and the factors that influence it.
2.1	From work alienation to policy alienation 

The intellectual roots of the alienation concept are found in the work of Karl Marx (1961 [1844]), who focused on objective work alienation: workers are alienated when they do not own the means of production or the resulting product. Most contemporary sociologists writing on alienation draw on Marx (Seeman 1959; Blauner 1964; Shepard 1971) although, in contrast to Marx, they focus on subjective work alienation: alienation as perceived by the worker (Kanungo 1982: 19).
	Sociologists have used the (subjective) alienation concept in various studies (Seeman 1959: 783) and this has resulted in a number of meanings being attributed to the concept (Kanungo 1982: 24). Seeman (1959: 783) differentiated these meanings into various alienation dimensions. Blauner (1964) used Seeman’s classification, and devised operational measures for three alienation dimensions: powerlessness, meaninglessness and social isolation.
	In the public administration literature, the concept of work alienation has not gone unnoticed. A number of scholars have used the concept, drawing on the alienation literature developed in both sociology and psychology. Pandey and Kingsley (2000, see also DeHart-Davis and Pandey 2005), for instance, have shown that work alienation is a strong predictor of the degree of red tape public employees experience. 
	In our study, however, we focus our attention on policy alienation rather than work alienation. How can the concept of alienation be linked to the world of policy implementation? Public policies refer to the binding allocation of values, for society as a whole, in a situation of structural scarcity due, for example, to a lack of financial or natural resources (Easton 1965). As a result, trade-offs occur between these values, for example between efficiency and equity (Stone 2003). This is why street-level bureaucrats are able to make their own judgement on the appropriate trade-off when applying a policy to an individual case, such as when a police officer decides whether to impose an on-the-spot fine (Lipsky 1980). When professional case workers have to implement a policy, many such trade-offs will occur. These public professionals, as members of professional communities or associations, also have to deal with professional norms and standards. We will focus on the alienation that public professionals experience in implementing policy in such a situation. 
	As stated, we define policy alienation as a general cognitive state of psychological disconnection from the policy programme being implemented, here by a public professional who regularly interacts directly with clients. This policy alienation concept differs in three important aspects from work alienation. First, it looks at alienation from the policy being implemented, rather than from the job being done. Second, it focuses on the public sector, whereas the work alienation concept was primarily developed for the private sector. Third, it considers professionals, whereas the work alienation concept predominantly focuses on manual workers. 
Having given a definition of the concept, our next step is to define its dimensions based on Blauner's ideas concerning work alienation. As with work alienation, policy alienation is seen as a multidimensional concept.
2.2	Policy powerlessness

Seeman (1959: 784) defines powerlessness as ‘the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behaviour cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, he seeks’. That is, powerless workers feel themselves to be objects controlled and manipulated by others or by an impersonal system. Blauner (1964: 16) discerned four ‘modes’ of powerlessness: 1) separation from ownership of the means of production and the resulting product; 2) the inability to influence general managerial policies; 3) the lack of control over employment conditions; and 4) the lack of control over the immediate work process.
	We can apply these four modes in distinguishing between three levels of policy powerlessness. In the realm of policy making and implementation, powerlessness relates to the degree of influence public professionals have in shaping the policy programme they have to implement. This influence may be exercised on strategic (Blauner’s second mode), tactical (Blauner’s third mode) or operational levels (Blauner’s fourth mode). The first of Blauner’s modes is not relevant here because it concerns objective alienation, whereas we focus on subjective alienation.
If they have little influence on the strategic policy level, professionals will likely experience feelings of powerlessness. This can occur, for example, when a new policy is drafted without the help of the professionals who have to implement it. 
	The tactical level refers to the professionals’ perceived influence on decisions concerning the way policy is implemented within their organisation. This relates to how policy goals are transformed into specific performance requirements, which the organisation has to meet, as well as to how resources (staff, budgets etc.) are allocated among the organisation’s units in order to meet these goals. In many agencies, performance management systems have been introduced to manage the implementation of policy programmes despite several studies having shown that these systems can have undesirable effects when output criteria become more important than societal outcomes (Smith 1995; Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). The more that professionals can effectively address these perverse effects at the agency level, the less they will experience powerlessness.




The second dimension of alienation distinguished by Blauner is meaninglessness. In the work alienation literature, meaninglessness has been defined as ‘the inability to comprehend the relationship of one’s contribution to a larger purpose’ (Sarros et al. 2002: 304). According to Blauner (1964: 23), work is more meaningful when someone 1) works on a unique and individual product; 2) works on a larger part of the product; or 3) is responsible for a larger part of the production process.
In the realm of policy making and implementation, meaninglessness refers to a professional’s perception of the contribution the policy makes to a greater purpose. As with powerlessness, meaninglessness can occur at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. 
At the strategic level, meaninglessness refers to a professional’s perception that a policy programme is not actually dealing with specific societal problems, or with the provision of desirable public goods and services, such as delivering financial protection and security.
At the tactical level, meaninglessness is based on the professional’s perception of the agency’s contribution in handling specific problems or delivering public goods. When agencies adopt managerial policies that focus on output goals that lack a clear relationship with specific societal goals, professionals are more likely to experience the policy as less meaningful. 
Finally, at the operational level, meaninglessness reflects the professionals’ perceptions of the contributions their own activities make to dealing with concrete, individual cases, as manifestations of broader societal problems. For instance, are they really helping people? If this is not the case, they will probably experience policy meaninglessness.

2.4	Social isolation - Role conflicts

Blauner sees social isolation as the third dimension of work alienation. Social isolation is generally seen as lacking a sense of belonging to the organisation in which you work, and being unable to identify with the organisation. According to Blauner (1964:23), ‘membership in an industrial community involves commitment to the work role and loyalty to one or more centres of the work community. Isolation, on the other hand, means that the worker feels no sense of belonging in the work situation and is unable to identify with the organisation.’ 
	Social isolation in relation to policy implementation is best analysed using the notion of role conflicts. When implementing a policy, professionals experience demands based on various logics, which stress different values and norms, and have a legitimacy of their own (Freidson 2001). Role conflicts arise when professionals perceive these demands to be incompatible. The social isolation concept looks specifically at the sense of belonging to one logic, that of the organisation. In contrast, the role conflict concept acknowledges the multiple logics that a professional has to deal with when implementing a policy. For instance, when implementing a policy, it is vital that professionals not only identify with their organisation, but also with the clients they treat.
	We distinguish four different logics (cf. Freidson 2001). First, the institutional logic referring to demands derived from policy contents; these are often laid down in formal rules and regulations, such as the policy goals to be achieved. Second, the organisational logic, which formulates a number of managerial demands that guide the proper implementation of the policy by the agency. Third, the professional logic, which expresses demands to be followed if one is to act professionally as a member of a professional community. Fourth, the client logic that focuses on the demands and values that a citizen (very often as a client of public administration) advances and which reflect their personal situation and interests. 
These logics can conflict with each other. For instance, when a public professional has the perception that certain rules have to be followed (institutional logic) but, in doing so, the needs of the individual client (client logic) cannot be fulfilled. Such role conflicts heighten the degree of policy alienation experienced by public professionals.
2.5	Factors possibly influencing policy alienation
The three dimensions of policy alienation can be influenced by several factors. Based on the public administration literature, the following two factors seem particularly relevant.
New public management




Table 1 Components of NPM (Hood 1991: 4-5)
No.	Component
1	‘Hands-on professional management’ in the public sector
2	Explicit standards and measures of performance
3	Greater emphasis on output controls
4	Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector
5	Shift to greater competition in the public sector
6	Stress on private-sector styles of management practice
7	Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use

We expect certain NPM components to be especially important in explaining the degree of policy alienation experienced by public professionals. Although we focus on perceived dysfunctions, we accept that NPM also has several positive characteristics (Pollitt 2003: 38-41).
	Firstly, we examine two overlapping components: the use of explicit standards and measures of performance (Component 2, referred to as ‘performance management’ from here on) and a greater emphasis on output controls (Component 3). A focus on output controls often requires public agencies, managers and employees to work according to performance targets (usually quantitative). Pollitt (2003: 46) argues that this kind of performance management can ‘lead to over-concentration on what is precisely quantifiable (for example costs, number of licenses issued) and an under-concentration on other aspects which are not so easily measured’. These quantifiable targets tend to focus on business values such as efficiency and results, and can take precedence over values such as equity, security and predictability. Public professionals may have difficulty accepting this changed trade-off in values which becomes manifest when implementing a policy programme (Hood 1991; Pollitt 2003). Emery and Giauque (2003: 475) note that ‘to focus on only the economic logic of action poses problems for public agents. They have to set aside some other shared values in order to concentrate solely on “measurement management”’. On this basis, we would expect public professionals to experience greater policy meaninglessness when performance management and output controls are used in implementing policy.
	Further, we expect public professionals to experience increased role conflicts when the use of performance management systems and output controls are increased. This is likely when the organisational logic strongly promotes values such as efficiency and results over other values such as professional autonomy (professional logic) and freedom of choice (client logic) (Smith 1995). This has similarities with the meaninglessness dimension, although the influences on the two dimensions are not necessarily the same. For example, a professional can view the NPM values of efficiency and results as very meaningful, but still sense an increased role conflict if a client does not view them in the same favourable light.
These two NPM components can also curtail professional autonomy. Extensive performance management often involves strict internal instructions and managers feel increasing pressure to produce results. We would expect such developments to make it harder for professionals to use discretion. Therefore, we expect public professionals to experience greater policy powerlessness when performance management and output controls are used in implementing policy.
	A second important element of NPM practices concerns the constant reorganisation, and the associated downsizing, of public organisations. This has parallels with the fourth (the disaggregation of public sector units) and seventh components of NPM (stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use) (Hood 1991: 5). There is increasing pressure on public organisations to become ‘lean’ and this often involves significant downsizing. The remaining employees are in a weakened position relative to management, especially when downsizing seems a never-ending process (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 172). When a new policy is implemented in such a situation, we would expect professionals to be less able to influence decisions concerning the way the policy is carried out. Therefore, we expect public professionals to experience greater policy powerlessness when an agency is undergoing reorganisation and downsizing.

ICT
Blauner (1964) saw technology as an important determinant of alienation. Today, ICT has substantially penetrated the fabric of public administration, especially in the execution of rules and service delivery (Dunleavy et al. 2006). 
	Looking at the effects of ICT, Zuboff (1988) differentiates between automating and informating ICT. The first is where technology ‘enables the same processes to be performed with more continuity and control’ (1988: 9). Automating presupposes formalisation and standardisation of the working processes. These developments can reduce the discretion of public professionals in implementing a policy (Bovens and Zouridis 2002). Thus, we would expect that the more that automating ICT is used when implementing a policy, the more the public professional experiences policy powerlessness.
	Alternatively, technology can ‘generate information about the underlying productive and administrative processes through which an organisation accomplishes its work’ (Zuboff 1988: 9). With the informing capacities of ICT, a professional is able to develop new skills and acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the cases personally handled. This may diminish the sense of meaninglessness. We therefore expect that the more that informating ICT is used when implementing a policy, the less public professionals will experience policy meaninglessness.
2.6	A theoretical framework

Based on the previous exploration, we have developed the theoretical framework shown in Figure 1: 


Figure 1 Theoretical framework: important factors influencing policy alienation dimensions

We can draw two main conclusions from this model. Firstly, we should consider policy alienation as a multidimensional concept, consisting of policy powerlessness, policy meaninglessness and role conflicts. Secondly, we should expect NPM components and ICT usage to influence the level of policy alienation in all three dimensions.

3	Policy alienation of Dutch insurance doctors and labour experts
3.1	Method

The second objective of this research was to empirically test and elaborate the theoretical framework. To this end, we conducted an exploratory case study (Yin 2003: 9). The study is exploratory in the sense that the available literature and existing knowledge base on policy alienation are poor. It is a case study since we investigate “how” and “why” questions (how can policy alienation be understood and why does it occur) in a contemporary setting over which we have no control. This exploratory case study will provide insights into the phenomenon and enable us to make theoretical generalisations. In this way, a more substantive theory of policy alienation can be constructed.
	The implementation of a new work disability decree in the Netherlands was seen as a relevant policy programme, and one in which two groups of professionals – doctors and labour experts – play an important role. These groups are similar as, firstly, they operate in the same institutional context and implement the same policy, although their precise tasks differ (Berendsen 2007). Secondly, they both work for the same organisation (the UWV). Thirdly, they are confronted with the same clients (claimants of welfare payments).Given these similarities, we follow a ‘most similar cases design’ (Lijphart 1975), which is also appropriate when the available literature and existing knowledge base are poor. 
	Further, in order to gain an in-depth reliable insight we used data triangulation (Yin 2003). We conducted an extensive document analysis, involving relevant policy documentation, professional magazines, newspaper articles and websites. Further, seven semi-structured interviews with individual insurance doctors and labour experts were held. We checked the validity of our reconstruction by presenting the preliminary results to a member of the executive board of each of the four involved professional associations - two for the doctors and two for the labour experts. The semi-structured interviews, as well as the document study, focused on the way doctors and labour experts perceived the implementation of the new rules in terms of policy alienation, and the factors that led to these perceptions.

3.2	Background
In 2004, the Dutch government drafted new, stricter rules regarding welfare benefits for citizens with work disabilities. The so-called adjusted assessment decree (ASB), which was implemented in October 2004, changed the insurance conditions for people already receiving work disability benefits. Together with a new law on work and income, the ASB aimed to save a total of €2 billion per year (SZW 2005). In practice, the ASB is implemented through programmes run by the Dutch Institute for Employees’ Insurance (UWV), a semi-autonomous agency of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.
	Within the UWV, insurance doctors and labour experts are involved in implementing the ASB. The doctors ‘provide social-medical evaluations with respect to the legislation concerning sick leave and employee disability’ (Berendsen 2007:225). The labour experts consider the claimant’s options within the labour market based on the insurance doctors’ medical report.

3.3	Manifestations of policy alienation

A report in 2005 by the doctors’ main professional association (NVVG) gave indications of the possible alienation of insurance doctors. The reason for writing the report was ‘the media commotion concerning the working experiences of doctors re-examining claimants within the framework of the ASB’ (NVVG 2005: 6). The NVVG sent a questionnaire to a random 25% of their members and 98 usable surveys were returned (69 per cent response rate). One question in the survey was whether the respondents found it appropriate to change the insurance conditions for those who were already receiving a benefit based on work disability. To this question, 52 per cent answered ‘yes’ and 48 per cent ‘no’. Clearly, a substantial proportion of the doctors did not fully agree with the policy, an indication of policy alienation. Other data also revealed doctors feeling psychologically disconnected from the ASB (NRC 2005b; SRA 2005; UWV 2005). As one interviewed insurance doctor stated:

What I think is wrong [about the ASB], is that the Legislator has become very unreliable. It is of course very frustrating when you first tell people they are work disabled, then you do nothing for 5-10 years, and then suddenly you give them the message: we have altered the insurance conditions - from tomorrow, you are no longer work disabled. These people had the impression that they could not work, and have adapted their lives. They will never be able to get a job.

However, other doctors disagreed. For example, another interviewed doctor stated that, ‘in my position as a chief insurance doctor […], I have embraced the ASB’. Thus, perhaps the best term to apply to the implementation of the ASB is controversial, with diverging opinions amongst the doctors. 
	With respect to the labour experts, a similar impression arises. Several sources indicate that many labour experts have problems with the ASB (NRC 2005b; SRA 2005; UWV 2005). An interviewed board member of a professional association of labour experts expressed this general feeling: 

A very large number of labour experts did not agree with this policy. They say, this is too strict, too rigid. I agree with this. First people were fully work disabled; now they are fully able to work. Only because government changed the rules.





Powerlessness refers to the influence (or rather lack of) that public professionals have to shape the policy programme at different policy levels. Have insurance doctors and labour experts experienced powerlessness and, if so, which factors influenced this? 

Strategic level
With respect to powerlessness at the strategic level, we have found hardly any evidence that doctors or labour experts were able to influence the shaping of the ASB. To do so, it would have been necessary to mobilise their professional associations and, although they tried, they did not see any results (UWV 2005: 4). The main professional associations of the doctors, the NVVG and the UWVA, did not become involved in the political debate concerning the drafting of the new rules (WAOcafé 2005a). Similarly, the professional associations of the labour experts – SRA and NVVA - did not intervene. As a result, many doctors and labour experts became frustrated with the lack of influence of their professional associations in shaping the ASB, and this contributes to feelings of powerlessness.
	This feeling of powerlessness was further increased as the UWV did not see it as its task to intervene in the political debate, even though its management knew that many professionals were complaining that the UWV was blindly accepting what the government was asking them to implement (NRC 2005a).

Tactical level
At the tactical level, the reorganisation that created the UWV was a factor that negatively affected the position of professionals since they could no longer effectively influence decisions concerning the way the policy was implemented. The UWV was established in 2002 through a merger of six organisations implementing different social security programmes in order to create a ‘lean’ and more integrated organisation at the implementation level. The relationship between the newly formed UWV and the Ministry is based on a contract form of governance, in which results and costs play an important role. As the six organisations merged, the task of reintegrating the former work-disabled people was effectively privatised. 
	This reorganisation can be framed in terms of NPM, with the results orientation a concretisation of the third NPM component - emphasis on output controls. The contract-based form of governance places the UWV ‘at arms-length’ (Component 4). The privatisation of the reintegration task is a shift towards marketisation/competition (Component 5). Finally, the focus on cost reduction, through downsizing, resembles the seventh component – stress on greater discipline in resource use.
	Following this reorganisation, several problems emerged. First, according to many employees, the UWV is ‘a Moloch [monster] with which people have difficulty identifying’ (NRC 2005a: 3). Second, since cost reduction was a major objective in the reorganisation, almost 10,000 people have had to find another job. A third factor is that the UWV is perceived of as very hierarchical (WAOcafé 2005b).
Given these circumstances, professionals within the UWV are in a weak position. This made it very difficult for the professionals to influence the way new policies, here the ASB, were implemented. An interviewed doctor stated:

We could not influence the policy very much. That is clear. The UWV is a top-down administrative organisation focused on administrative processes. The professionals re-examining the clients are not the priority of the UWV. We were not consulted about the implementation conditions regarding the ASB.

Operational level 
The new rules substantially changed the discretion available to the doctors and labour experts. Many doctors perceived their level of discretion to have decreased (NRC 2005b). A survey by the NVVG drew the same conclusion: 63 per cent of the respondents answered ‘yes’ to the question whether they felt their professional autonomy was lower than it should be. Important reasons given were the strict internal UWV performance criteria plus the managerial focus on results, both associated with the ASB (NVVG 2005). Thus, these overlapping NPM components did decrease discretion, as we hypothesised in the theoretical framework. However, this feeling was not universal. One doctor had commented that he could still make decisions ‘in all freedom’ (cited in WAOcafé 2006). Further, some doctors who initially experienced reduced discretion have since accepted the situation. As one interviewed doctor stated: 

In the beginning, I had a strong feeling that I was being constrained, in the sense that I had to increasingly justify my decisions. Even when someone could do almost nothing, I still had to send them to a labour expert. That was the biggest problem for me but, know I am used to it; I do not have problems with it any more.
	
The introduction of a new ICT system was particularly relevant in terms of the operational powerlessness of the labour experts. For more than ten years, labour experts had used a database, containing more than 7,000 job descriptions, to distil possible job profiles. A new system was introduced in 2001, which was both less automating and more informating (Van der Hart and Moekoet 2003). This was expected to increase the discretion of the labour experts but, with the ASB implementation, the opposite occurred. Managers, who were experiencing increased pressure to produce results, used the ICT system to limit the discretion of the labour experts. The following quote by a labour expert, looking at the interaction of the managerial NPM practices (Components 2 and 3) and the ICT system, illustrates this (cited in LVA 2006: 5):

The new system is subjective. The labour expert has more freedom to choose. There is more room for interpretation. This can go two ways. Pressure was increased by management to find more, and better paid, jobs suitable for the client and consequently to lower their disability percentage. This was the reason I came into conflict with the organisation.

Overall, the discretion of the labour experts seems to have decreased more than that of the insurance doctors although both generally experience less discretion. The doctor’s discretion in their core task – providing social-medical evaluations – did not change significantly, whereas, for the labour experts, their discretion over actual work content did (Bannink et al. 2006). The combination of NPM practices and a new computer system significantly reduced the discretion open to the labour experts, turning them increasingly into screen-level bureaucrats.






Here, meaninglessness is in terms of the professionals’ perceptions regarding the policy’s contribution to a larger purpose. This can be on three levels.

Strategic level
The official objective of the ASB is to increase participation in work by the disabled by looking at a person’s potential rather than their limitations (SZW 2005). Two arguments stressed in justifying this are, firstly, that it is nearly always healthier for people with physical or psychological problems to be active and, secondly, that Dutch social security has become too expensive and money has to be saved. 
	In many eyes, the economic goal of the ASB seems to dominate. As one doctor put it: ‘I see it more as a cost savings policy than a method to get people in work’ (WAOcafé 2006). If this is true, then NPM-based considerations would seem to dominate in the trade-off of values in the ASB implementation, leading to a shift in value orientation: a move not welcomed by most doctors and labour experts (NVVG 2005; WAOcafé 2006). This can be seen as a concretisation of the seventh component of NPM: a greater discipline in resource use (Hood 1991).
Another factor contributing to strategic meaninglessness, as witnessed by our respondents, was the multitude of policy changes regarding work disability. Between 2002 and 2006, major policy changes included the ‘Gatekeeper Improvement Act’, the ASB and a new law on work and income. Before labour experts and doctors were able to work out what one policy meant for their work, there was already another policy to implement. Such a situation contributes to feelings of strategic meaninglessness. As one doctor put it:

Lately there have been so many changes. First the adjustments to the ASB, now the law regarding work and income. It happens all the time. I do not feel ‘connected’ with politicians. Often they propose things which are not well thought out, and which have to be implemented right away.

One aspect of the ASB, which many professionals did agree with, was the fact that almost everyone receiving a work disability benefit had to be re-examined. Many claimants who were re-examined had not been examined for years, and so it became possible to assess changes in their condition, as well as remedy any previous judgemental errors. Almost all our respondents (six out of seven) explicitly welcomed this. As one labour expert put it:

A positive aspect was the “cleaning of the databases”. Previously, some professionals had implemented the rules very liberally, and some clients had been unjustifiably labelled work disabled, and this could now be remedied.

Tactical level
On the tactical level, meaninglessness reflects a professional’s perception of the contribution their agency makes in handling specific problems or delivering public goods.
The UWV had to implement the ASB and, in a short period, more than 325,000 people had to be re-examined. To achieve this, the UWV focused primarily on the number of re-examinations completed, thereby using strict performance criteria (NPM Component 2) and a focus on results (Component 3). While most professionals agreed with re-examination in theory, the strict quantitative performance criteria associated with this process had some unwelcome consequences. Most importantly, the UWV had to recruit external doctors and labour experts, often inexperienced, to cope with the increased workload. Almost all the respondents disagreed with this practice. As one explained:

What really bothers us [insurance doctors] is that, owing to a shortage of re-examination capacity, doctors are brought in from outside. These doctors often do not know what they are talking about. They just have an interest in finishing as many cases as possible a day. The quality they deliver is really unsatisfactory.

Operational level
On the operational level, meaninglessness refers to the professionals’ perceptions of their own contribution to dealing with concrete, individual cases. Many doctors and labour experts did not expect the vast majority of former work-disabled people to find work (LVA 2006). For a start, two-thirds of the claimants re-examined stated that their situation had deteriorated over time (Deursen et al. 2007: 7). As one doctor commented (cited in NRC 2005a): 

I cannot put my signature to a medical evaluation which inevitably results in state assistance for the person…someone who is unemployed for ten years, and searching for a job again, that is impossible. The statements by the Social Economic Council (SER) are right: they state that you shouldn’t construct the ASB.

However, not all shared this view: a number of respondents stressed that being labelled as work-disabled for a very long time, especially for younger claimants, is detrimental to their health. This is in line with the first argument behind the ASB: that it is healthier for people to be active. 
	Secondly, for some professionals, it was significant that the UWV was no longer responsible for the reintegration of former claimants. Documents (UWV 2005: 7) – supported by the interviews – show that the labour experts in particular perceive this as an impoverishment of their service. This feeling seems to be linked with the view of many that cost reduction (NPM Component 7) is the main goal of the ASB and the newly established UWV, not getting people back to work. This makes it harder for the individual labour experts to see themselves as contributing to the wellbeing of the client.





Two role conflicts are seen as contributing to the policy alienation felt by the involved public professionals. 

Institutional-client conflict
The first role conflict emerges from the tension between the rules of the ASB (institutional logic) and the demands of the claimants (client logic). As noted, both doctors and labour experts are doubtful that the reassessment of claimants actually contributes to the ASB’s claimed goal of increasing work participation. Moreover, even where professionals do see their role as meaningful in that benefits are being reduced -for example, for younger claimants- this does not necessarily decrease the sense of role conflict. In our study, all the interviewed doctors experienced some degree of institutional-client conflict. As one put it:

What you notice is that clients are re-examined using today’s norms. .… Nowadays, there is a lot more emphasis on re-activating the clients. A direct result is that the financial status of the clients changes [their disability benefit is reduced]. That has a considerable social impact on these clients.

For labour experts, this role conflict is particularly relevant. They have to tell the clients if their work-disability benefit is going to be reduced, and this intensifies the role conflict because the clients often blame the labour expert directly for their reduced benefit: ‘Now that the social safety net is reduced, labour experts will more often have the role of a bringer of bad news. The UWV recently received threatening letters, showing that labour experts risk being the scapegoats of the re-examinations’ (Hagoort 2004:4). The interviewed labour experts themselves experience this, sometimes to an extreme degree. One labour expert stated that some clients ask him how he can implement such a decree. Others said that some of their colleagues had been threatened by clients.

Organisational-professional conflict




In this article, we have conceptualised policy alienation and tried to understand the factors that influence it by building a theoretical framework. This framework was elaborated through an exploratory case study involving Dutch insurance doctors and labour experts implementing a new work disability decree (ASB). The results of the case study are shown in Figure 2:


Figure 2 Factors from the ASB policy influencing the degree of policy alienation felt by insurance doctors and labour experts.

The figure emphasises how the various policy alienation dimensions influence each other. For example, when professionals experience low discretion, they feel less able to effectively cope with role conflicts. 
	Further, we see that a number of factors influence these dimensions for both groups of professionals. The weak position of the UWV, and of the professional associations, in the political debate contributed to the feeling of many doctors and labour experts that they were powerless. Moreover, the many policy changes increased the sense of policy meaningless for many professionals. Re-examining claimants who had not been examined for many years was, however, generally seen as meaningful. Further, the participation in work goal was generally seen as meaningful, especially for younger claimants.
	For the labour experts, the use of a new ICT system was also relevant. The combination of a more informating and less automating new system with management pressure to produce results significantly reduced the labour experts’ discretion, turning them increasingly into screen-level bureaucrats.
	Nevertheless, the most important factors in explaining the policy alienation seemed to be components of NPM. As such, we can apply the policy alienation framework to enhance knowledge on how NPM is experienced on ‘the work floor’ by professionals implementing policies. We see this as a clear contribution that the policy alienation framework can make to the field of public management, and now focus on this aspect.
As Pollitt (2003: 32) notes, ‘the overall picture is likely to be complicated – NPM has eight or nine different elements, and each of these may work well or badly and may generate additional, unforeseen or unwanted effects’. In our empirical analysis, we saw that a number of the NPM components influenced the experiences of professionals in terms of policy alienation. One should not forget, however, that we were primarily looking at perceived dysfunctions of NPM, and therefore largely ignored its positive side.
Firstly, NPM-based performance management and output controls influenced all three dimensions of policy alienation. As hypothesised, many professionals experienced increased powerlessness, meaninglessness and role conflicts. These feelings were, however, not universal. For instance, some respondents stated that they could effectively cope with the role conflict by communicating with their manager. In this way, management can act as a buffer for the strict performance criteria. It is therefore unwarranted to blame management for all the problems associated with quantitative performance management and output criteria. This relationship between management and professionals should be explored further, examining how management and professionals interact in NPM contexts.
	Further, we observed the consequences of a major reorganisation on the degree of policy alienation experienced. One element of this reorganisation was the privatisation of the reintegration of those formerly declared as work-disabled. Implementing the ASB, which only focused on the re-examinations, was therefore seen as less meaningful than their previous function by many labour experts, leading to motivational problems. So, in addition to a separation of related public tasks making it harder to achieve an integrated service (Pollitt 2003: 48), we observe that it can also lead to a greater sense of policy alienation by professionals, and possibly to motivational problems. 
	A second element of the reorganisation was that almost 10,000 UWV employees were to be dismissed. A number of authors (Hood 1991; Pollitt 2003) state that downsizing, in combination with increased performance management, can lead to a lowering of the public service ethic, as employees become more instrumental and calculating in their attitudes. However, in our study, this did not seem to have taken place: many doctors and labour experts had moral and professional problems with the ASB and the reorganisation precisely because they wanted to serve their clients properly. They did not seem to have become more instrumental or calculating in their attitudes, by, for example, re-examining the clients less rigorously.
	Finally, we observed that the ASB goal of cost reduction, and the related stricter rules, increased the degree of meaninglessness and role conflicts experienced by many, but not all, professionals. Some professionals did agree with this cost-cutting goal, agreeing that the social security system had become too expensive. As with other factors influencing policy alienation, we see that not all professionals experience them in the same way. While the factors included in our model can explain why feelings of policy alienation have evolved, they do not explain why some public professionals feel more alienated than others. More research is needed to explain why this is so.






ASB	Aangepast schattingsbesluit	Adjusted assessment decree
NRC	NRC Handelsblad	A leading daily newspaper
NVVA	Nederlandse vereniging van arbeidsdeskundigen	General association for labour experts
NVVG	Nederlandse vereniging voor verzekeringsgeneeskunde	Association of insurance doctors
SRA	Stichting register arbeidsdeskundigen	Professional association of labour experts
SZW	Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid	Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
UWV	Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemers Verzekeringen	Organisation for employees’ insurance
UWVA	Vereniging van verzekeringsartsen werkzaam bij het UWV	Association of insurance doctors working at the UWV
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Weak position of professional associations and UWV in political debate






Policy powerlessness (strategic, tactical and operational)

ICT: less automated and more informated (only labour experts)














Reorganisation of UWV: privatisation of reintegration part (Component 5)


Reorganisation of UWV: downsizing (Component 7)


ASB cost savings goal / strict ASB rules (Component 7)

Reorganisation of UWV: at arms-length (Component 4)




























^1	  Abbreviations are explained at the end of this article.
